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Australia’s energy sector has a long history of 
subsidies, ranging from government-built 
infrastructure to favourable taxation regimes. The 
most significant current subsidy is the unpriced cost 
of carbon emissions, measured as the impacts of 
climate change on economic growth, environmental 
systems, health, and security. Excluding the cost of 
carbon pollution from decision-making creates 
market distortions and the undervaluation of 
emission reduction.  
This in turn results in investment and policy settings 
that cannot enable the long-term deep 
decarbonisation that is necessary for Australia to 
contribute to the globally agreed goal of avoiding 
global warming of 2°C or more.  It also results in the 
transfer of the risks and costs of climate change 
away from those responsible for producing 
emissions and onto the community. In short, it 
allows carbon-intensive energy companies to 
privatise their gains and socialise their losses.  
Other countries and institutions have begun to 
address this “carbon subsidy” by incorporating the 
costs of carbon pollution in public policy-making. 
The United States, for example, has developed 
carbon valuation pathways that approximate what 
society should be willing to pay to reduce carbon 
pollution. These pathways inform the development 
of regulations to reduce emissions. Similarly, the 
United Kingdom uses carbon values to test any 
policies that reduce or increase emissions against 
the country’s 2050 emission goal, which is derived 
from the international agreement to keep climate 
change below 2°C. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) recently calculated the real costs of fossil fuels 
for over 150 countries including Australia, using a 
carbon cost of US$35 per tonne. 
Applying carbon valuations developed by the US 
government to carbon pollution from Australia’s 
energy sector reveals an implicit “carbon subsidy” 
of approximately $14-39 billion annually. This is 
provided to emitters across electricity, transport, 
direct combustion and fugitive emissions.1 The 
electricity sector alone receives a carbon subsidy of 
about $7-20 billion a year.  
Without policies to significantly cut energy 
emissions, the carbon subsidy to energy will 
continue to grow. The annual carbon subsidy to 
non-electricity energy is projected to be about $12-
36 billion by 2020 and $16-49 billion by 2030.  
The size of the carbon subsidy to electricity will be 
influenced by any changes to the Renewable Energy 
Target (RET). The RET is effectively a subsidy to 
renewable electricity providers, with resource costs 
of approximately $14 billion (net present value) 
between now and 2030. These costs are far smaller 
than the carbon subsidy provided to coal and gas-
fired power companies. Under the current legislated 
RET, the annual subsidy would be $9-28 billion by 
2020 and $12-37 billion by 2030; in total the subsidy 
between 2015 and 2030 would be $165-500 billion. 
However, under a reduced RET the subsidy would 
increase by about $0.7-2 billion annually. If the RET 
were abolished altogether (and current 
arrangements grandfathered), the carbon subsidy 
would increase by about $0.8-2.5 billion annually. 
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“Many energy prices in many countries are 
wrong. They are set at levels that do not 
reflect environmental damage, notably global 
warming, air pollution, and various side 
effects of motor vehicle use. In so doing, 
many countries raise too much revenue from 
direct taxes on work effort and capital 
accumulation and too little from taxes on 
energy use.”  
International Monetary Fund 
Getting Energy Prices Right 2014 
Governments subsidise energy production and/or 
consumption in a range of ways and for a range of 
reasons. Subsidies may be explicit or implicit. 
Explicit financial subsidies include tax deductions 
for activities related to exploration or production, 
government investment in research and 
development,  public spending on fuel transport 
infrastructure, such as power stations or pipelines, 
and policies that provide above-market revenues or 
hold prices below market rates. Implicit subsidies  
are created by allowing energy producers or users 
to avoid paying the costs of any damage their 
activities cause. Such externalised costs include air 
pollution, carbon emissions and congestion, among 
others.  
The International Energy Agency (IEA) notes that key 
rationales for energy subsidies are to promote 
economic development and technological 
advancement. However, the IEA also notes that 
poorly directed subsidies result in the misallocation  
 
 
 
 
of costs and resources by “encouraging excessive 
energy consumption, artificially promoting capital-
intensive industries, reducing incentives for 
investment in renewable energy, and accelerating 
the depletion of natural resources” (IEA, 2013). 
Costs may be transferred from one type of energy 
producer or consumer to another, or they may be 
transferred to other groups entirely. For example, air 
pollution is suffered by those in its vicinity, 
irrespective of whether they contribute to it; the 
costs of resulting health impacts may also be paid 
by taxpayers more broadly. The costs of carbon 
emissions and climate change are imposed on the 
public, other nations and future generations. Failure 
to price the costs of greenhouse gas emissions also 
inflates the competitiveness of high-carbon energy 
relative to low-carbon energy. 
While subsidies may be justified if they address 
market barriers to innovation in publicly desirable 
areas (based on the assumption that such 
innovation will ultimately improve broader public 
welfare), most existing energy subsidies do not do 
this. The IEA calculates that subsidies to global 
fossil fuel consumption alone total about US $540 
billion.2 The IMF – looking at both production and 
consumption subsidies and quantifying the 
externalised cost of climate change – calculated that 
global subsidies to fossil fuels in 2011 totalled at 
least US$1.9 trillion.3 Subsidies to renewable energy 
technologies, which are considerably less mature, 
totalled just $88 billion that year.4  
 
 
 
Why do energy 
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Figure 1. Global subsidies to fossil fuels, 2011 (US$). 
Source: IMF 
 
The IMF notes that coal use is “pervasively 
undercharged, not only for carbon emissions, but 
also for the health costs of local air pollution”. 
Significant tax increases are also necessary to 
internalise the costs of carbon emissions from 
natural gas, although air pollution damage from 
natural gas is “modest” in comparison with coal.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motor fuel taxes generally need to be higher 
primarily to reflect the costs of accidents and traffic 
congestion rather than carbon emissions and air 
pollution.6 
Removing subsidies would produce significant 
benefits. The IMF found that including within energy 
prices the costs of air pollution and greenhouse gas 
emissions would reduce global emissions by 13 per 
cent, or 4.5 billion tonnes. Significant health benefits 
would also result, due to a 10 million ton reduction 
in sulphur dioxide (SO2) and a 13 percent reduction 
in other local air pollutants.7  
The longer a subsidy is in place, the more 
entrenched its impact on market conditions, and the 
greater the adjustment required to its removal. This 
means that long-standing subsidies can be 
extremely difficult to remove, as market participants 
have factored their existence into decision-making 
and may be adversely affected by subsidy removal. 
For this reason, governments often face strong 
opposition to attempts to reduce or remove energy 
subsidies. 
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Australia has a complex system of energy subsidies. 
Analysis to date has tended to focus on explicit 
financial subsidies to energy resource production 
and under-priced road use. 
For example, a 1996 report by the National Institute 
of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) 
estimated annual financial subsidies to the 
Australian energy and transport sectors at $1.9 
billion (in 1994 dollars).8 In 2000, the Senate 
Environment, Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts References Committee 
cited this figure and found another $4 billion 
indirectly provided to fossil fuels via “tax incentives, 
startup grants, preferential purchasing agreements 
for oil, and biased market structures”. The 
Committee found renewable energy programs 
received federal subsidies of $360 million per year. 9 
Analysis by the Institute for Sustainable Futures 
found a wide range of financial subsidies that 
totalled $9-10 billion in 2005-6. Of this, more than 
96 per cent supported fossil fuels, with just over 
$300 million to support renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. Among the largest subsidies were 
the annual $4.7 billion “road user deficit” – the gap 
between total government revenue from road 
access and usage charges and the public cost of 
establishing and maintaining the road network – and 
government intervention to lower coal costs for 
electricity generation, worth some $400-1100 
million.10  
More recent analysis by Environment Victoria and 
Market Forces found a slightly higher level of fossil 
fuel subsidies (about $11 billion annually) through a 
different methodology. This analysis identified fuel 
tax credits (nearly $6 billion annually), excise 
concessions for aviation gasoline and turbine fuel 
($1.3 billion) and accelerated depreciation for oil, 
gas and petroleum extraction ($1.8 billion) as the 
largest fossil fuel subsidies currently in operation.11  
The definition of some of these measures as energy 
subsidies is contentious. For example, the federal 
government does not consider the fuel tax credits 
regime as a subsidy. Excise on diesel fuel was 
originally introduced to help fund road construction 
and maintenance; off-road diesel use by mining, 
agriculture and other industries should therefore not 
be subject to the excise.12 13 14  On the other hand, 
fuel excise is not hypothecated to road funding, and 
as many changes to the excise regime have been to 
increase general revenue rather than to direct more 
resources at roads the provision of credits to some 
industries and not others may be considered a 
subsidy to the former.15   
Through the G20, Australia in 2009 committed to 
“rationalize and phase out over the medium term 
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies”.16 The federal 
government concluded in 2010 that none of 
Australia’s existing federal policies constitute such 
subsidies: “Australia does not have any sector-
specific tax expenditures for fossil fuel production 
(although fossil fuel producers are able to access 
general measures that apply across the economy or 
across the mining and quarrying sector as a 
whole).”17 Subsidy watchdog Oil Change 
International notes that this wording excludes 
“policies that have the effect, though not the intent, 
of subsidizing fossil-fuels [and] special tax breaks 
for extractive industries (e.g., percentage depletion) 
that are generally viewed as subsidies in most other 
countries in the world.”18 
In the past few years, governments have increased 
and decreased support for renewable energy 
through a range of policy changes. State 
governments introduced and then wound back 
Energy subsidies 
in Australia 
 
 
  7 
 
feed-in tariffs for solar PV panels. Key avenues for 
Commonwealth support for renewables are the RET, 
the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC), and 
the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA). 
The CEFC and ARENA receive roughly $2.5 billion in 
annual federal funding (unless both bodies are 
dismantled, as proposed by the government). The 
RET and state feed-in tariffs are cross-subsidies, in 
that support for renewables is provided by other 
electricity market participants. The government’s 
recent RET review warned that the RET would result 
in a “$22 billion cross-subsidy to the renewables 
sector in net present value terms over the remainder 
of the scheme”.19 The bulk of this cross-subsidy 
comes from fossil fuelled power providers. 
Little analysis exists of the scale of Australia’s 
implicit energy subsidies.  
NIEIR’s 1996 report developed a conservative 
estimate of the “greenhouse externality” associated 
with electricity use, which it placed at 1.5¢/kWh for 
coal and 0.75¢/kWh for natural gas generating 
facilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This produced an annual implicit carbon subsidy to 
electricity of $1.9 billion, out of a total environmental 
subsidy of $2.5 billion. Road transport was 
estimated to receive an implicit subsidy of $0.2-1.3 
billion for other types of environmental externalities 
associated with petroleum use (primarily air 
pollutants).20 
The IMF has made two recent attempts to quantify 
the implicit subsidies created by not pricing air 
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Its 2013 
analysis found that Australia’s implicit subsidies to 
oil, coal and gas to be worth 1.8 per cent of GDP, or 
about $23 billion annually.21 This analysis used an 
estimated carbon subsidy of US$25 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide (t CO2). The IMF’s 2014 report 
applied an updated estimate of US$35/tCO2, along 
with country-specific estimates of the cost of the air 
pollution from energy-related emissions of sulphur 
dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and PM2.5. 
This report did not provide an estimate of the total 
cost of these subsidies to Australian energy.22 
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“A charge should be levied on fossil fuels in 
proportion to their CO2 emissions multiplied 
by the global damage from those emissions”  
International Monetary Fund 
Getting Energy Prices Right 2014 
Putting a value on the social benefit of carbon 
reduction 
An essential step in valuing the costs of climate 
change or, conversely, the benefits of avoiding it, is 
to calculate what those costs are. Such calculations 
will necessarily involve a range of uncertainties and 
any estimates will need to be regularly revised. 
However, estimates that are transparently produced 
and regularly updated help to ensure that policy 
decisions take account of improving knowledge and 
evidence. 
Several countries, including the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom, have adopted a 
range of values for carbon emissions to use in 
decision-making.   
The US government has developed a set of carbon 
values to estimate the social cost of carbon (see 
Box 1). This is an estimate of the economic damage 
caused by each additional tonne of CO2 emitted into 
the atmosphere in a given year. Future costs are 
discounted to represent what society should be 
willing to pay in the present. The US estimates apply 
different discount rates and different probability 
distributions. The 3 per cent average pathway is 
considered the “central estimate”, while the 3 per 
cent 95th percentile pathway reflects a one-in-20 risk 
of significantly greater climate sensitivity.23 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The United States’ “Social Cost of Carbon”’ 
values, 2013 update. 
 
 
The UK government takes a slightly different 
approach. It has derived carbon valuation 
trajectories from a long-term national emission 
target of 80 per cent below 1990 levels which it 
considers an appropriate UK contribution to global 
emission reductions consistent with limiting global 
temperature rise to “as little as possible above 
2°C”.24 
These carbon values represent an annual cost-per-
tonne limit on the investment that needs to be 
triggered for the UK to reach its target. In other 
words, any emissions reductions that can be 
achieved at a lower cost per tonne are necessary to 
reach the target.25  
Because the UK participates in multinational 
emission reduction efforts through the EU Emission 
Trading System in addition to its domestic emission 
reduction policies, it has developed separate 
marginal abatement cost curves for the “traded 
sector” (industries covered by the EU ETS) and the 
“non-traded sector”. The prices in each sector align 
from 2030, reflecting an expectation that 
international carbon trading will be fully operational 
from that point.26 
 
Tackling the implicit subsidy 
of unpriced carbon 
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Figure 3. EU Emission Trading System marginal 
abatement cost curves, traded and non-traded 
sectors. 
 
Figure 4, below, shows several carbon value paths 
used by the US and UK. 
Figure 4. Carbon values, US and UK, selected years 
*Combined traded and non-traded sector prices, weighted by share 
of total emissions 
The US uses its carbon values to inform cost-benefit 
analysis. For example, the US Environment 
Protection Agency (EPA) recently proposed 
emission performance standards for existing fossil 
fuel generators. The EPA’s proposal contained cost-
benefit analysis showing that the societal value of 
avoided carbon dioxide emissions would reach 
US$10-92 billion annually by 2030 (range represents 
the spread of carbon value trajectories).  
Health improvements due to reductions of other 
pollutants were also quantified and monetised.27 
The IMF used a single, simplified US carbon value 
(US$35/t CO2, based on the central estimate for 
2010) to calculate the externalised carbon costs of 
energy in over 150 countries (IMF 2014).  
The UK has incorporated carbon valuation into 
guidance on policy appraisal for all UK government 
agencies, to use to “assess proposals leading to an 
increase or a reduction in energy use or greenhouse 
gas emissions in the UK. It covers proposals that 
have a direct impact on energy use and supply and 
those with an indirect impact through planning, 
construction, land use change or the introduction of 
new products that use energy.”28  
 
How big are Australia’s carbon subsidies to 
energy? 
Applying US carbon valuations to carbon emissions 
from Australian energy allows for an estimate of the 
implicit carbon subsidy to energy production and 
use in Australia. Applying the 3 per cent average 
and 95th percentile values gives a subsidy of 
approximately $14-39 billion in 2012. This can be 
broken down by sector: $7-20 billion for electricity, 
$3-9 billion each for transport and direct 
combustion, and about $0.3-1 billion for fugitive 
emissions from resource production. As noted 
above, the 3 per cent average value is the US 
government’s central estimate and the 95th 
percentile represents the 5 per cent risk of 
significantly greater climate sensitivity. The US 
carbon values apply only to carbon dioxide 
emissions, so the costs of other greenhouse gases 
are excluded. This results in a significant 
underestimate of the costs of fugitive emissions, in 
particular, which are mainly methane, a more potent 
but shorter-lived greenhouse gas than carbon 
dioxide. 
If Australia fails to internalise these costs in energy 
prices, the carbon subsidy to energy will continue to 
increase, due both to growth in energy-related 
emissions and the higher social cost of emissions as 
time passes. Figure 5 shows the size of the subsidy 
for selected years, under the same two US carbon 
valuation trajectories, based on Treasury projections 
of a ‘no carbon price’ scenario.29  
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Figure 5. Carbon subsidy to Australian energy-related 
CO2 in the absence of a carbon price or equivalent 
regulation. 
 
More recent electricity sector projections show a 
much slower rise in electricity demand growth, so 
the subsidy to electricity may grow more slowly than 
Treasury’s projections would indicate. Recent 
electricity sector demand forecasts produced by 
ACIL Allen and Jacobs, for example, show electricity 
demand about 10 per cent lower than Treasury’s 
projections by 2020, and about 20 per cent lower by 
2030.30 31 
On the other hand, the Treasury modelling scenario 
used above assumed the maintenance and 
achievement of the legislated RET. Modelling by 
Jacobs finds that, assuming lower demand and the 
current RET, carbon emissions from electricity in 
2020 would total 172 million tonnes, for a carbon 
subsidy of $9-28 billion.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2030 the sector’s carbon emissions would reach 
186 million tonnes, for a carbon subsidy of $12-37 
billion. The total carbon subsidy to electricity 
between 2015 and 2030 would be $165-500 billion 
(Figure 6). Note that this figure already includes a 
discount rate of 3 per cent. 
However, reducing the RET would increase 
emissions from electricity and therefore the carbon 
subsidy to the sector. The carbon subsidy to the 
sector would increase by $0.7-2 billion annually by 
2020 if the RET were reduced to ensure renewable 
generation made up no more than 20 per cent of 
electricity (“Reduced RET), and by $0.8-2.5 billion 
annually if the RET were closed and existing 
investments grandfathered (“Abolished RET”). In 
2030 the annual subsidy would have increased by 
$0.7-2.3 billion under a Reduced RET, and $1-3 
billion under an Abolished RET. These two scenarios 
roughly correlate to the recommendations of the 
Warburton RET Review.  
Figure 7. Increase in carbon subsidy to electricity if the 
RET is reduced or abolished, selected years. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6. Electricity sector 
emissions and carbon 
subsidy, 2015-2030. 
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How should Australia address its carbon 
subsidies to energy? 
As the analysis presented above demonstrates, the 
carbon subsidy provided to energy is far greater any 
of the explicit financial subsidies currently 
benefitting Australian fossil fuels, let alone any 
subsidies to Australian renewable energy. 
 
Yet Australian decision-making assigns no weight to 
carbon damages, effectively ignoring the carbon 
subsidy and valuing emission reduction at zero 
economic benefit.  
 
The inadequacy of Australia’s current approach was 
demonstrated by the recent RET Review. This 
review considered the RET’s cost-effectiveness, 
finding that the RET imposes additional resource 
costs of $14 billion over the next years to 2040, and, 
as noted above, a cross-subsidy of $22 billion, 
mainly from fossil generators, to renewable 
generators. 
 
 
 
 
However, in judging that the RET represented too 
high a cost to the economy, the review ignored the 
carbon subsidy already provided to the power 
sector. Instead it relied on unfounded assertions 
about the ability of policies like the still undeveloped 
Emission Reduction Fund to achieve emission 
reductions at lower cost; did not consider any 
potential emission reduction to be undertaken 
nationally beyond Australia’s minimum 2020 target 
of a 5 per cent reduction from 2000 levels; and 
ignored any benefits of emission reduction.   
 
Estimates of the social cost of carbon provide an 
indication, however imperfect, of what society ought 
to be willing to pay now to avoid the costs of climate 
change. Australia would benefit from using a range 
of estimates of the social cost of carbon as lower 
bound estimates of the benefits of carbon reduction. 
This would enable more thorough and realistic 
assessment of the costs and benefits of decisions 
that affect Australia’s prospects of carbon reduction 
and clean energy. 
 
 
 
  
Developing carbon values by calculating the social cost of carbon
A social cost of carbon pathway is calculated using one or several Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), which 
combine a simplified climate model and a simplified economic model into a cohesive numerical model to 
capture the feedback effects between the two. 
This method is at best an incomplete guide to the costs of climate change, and the following weaknesses 
suggest that the social cost of carbon should be treated as a lower bound estimate in policy making.33 34 35 
Estimates of the social cost of carbon apply only to carbon dioxide and exclude the impacts of other 
greenhouse gas emissions. They are intended to include changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, 
property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to climate change. IAMs 
do not assign value to all of the impacts of climate change recognized in the climate change literature because 
of lack of precise information on the nature of damages and because the science incorporated into these 
models lags behind the most recent research.  For example, the models currently completely omit the effects of 
some large ecosystem changes that drive other climate impacts, such as ocean acidification (which leads to 
decreased fish supplies and a potential large scale ecosystem collapse) and neglect or only partially address 
potentially catastrophic damages such as the collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation or the 
West Antarctic Ice Sheet, or large releases of methane from melting permafrost and warming oceans. This has 
resulted in IAM simulations ignoring the possibility of catastrophic events with significant harms to human 
welfare. 
Social cost of carbon calculations also take contentious approaches to inter-generational and inter-regional 
welfare. Inter-generational welfare is approached via the choice of discount rate. As climate impacts occur over 
long time periods, their costs are highly sensitive to discounting. The common practice of using market interest 
rates gives a much lower value to benefits accruing to future generations, which has been criticised on ethical 
grounds. 
With regard to inter-regional welfare, the social cost of carbon has been criticised for excluding equity 
weighting. Equity weighting assigns a higher value to a dollar’s worth of damage occurring in a poor region than 
to one occurring in a wealthy one, in recognition of the latter’s greater adaptive capacity. A well-established 
methodology for equity weighting is available, but it is not generally used in these estimates. Applying the social 
cost of carbon to domestic policies is also complicated by the fact that it represents global rather than domestic 
costs. Given the interdependencies of national economies and the vulnerability of each one to climate impacts 
on others, however, the distinction between global and local impacts is not clear-cut. 
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